(Solved) : Consider Following Modified Version Padded Rsa Encryption Assume Messages Encrypted Length Q29335085 . . .
Cryptology question:
![Consider the following modified version of padded RSA encryption: Assume messages to be encrypted have length exactly IIN /2. To encrypt, first compute m := 0x0??0x001m where r is a uniform string of length ||N1l/2 - 16. Then compute the ciphertext c[modN]. When decrypting a ci- phertext c, the receiver computes m[cmodN] and returns an error of m does not consist of 0z00 followed by ||N1l/2 - 16 arbitrary bits followed by 0r00. Show that this scheme is not CCA-secure. Why is it easier to construct a chosen-ciphertext attack on this scheme than on PKCS #1 v1.5?](https://d2vlcm61l7u1fs.cloudfront.net/media%2F5b9%2F5b970288-e16e-4e37-80e7-4af78ce55b99%2FphphUUI5Y.png)
Consider the following modified version of padded RSA encryption: Assume messages to be encrypted have length exactly IIN /2. To encrypt, first compute m := 0x0??0x001m where r is a uniform string of length ||N1l/2 – 16. Then compute the ciphertext c[modN]. When decrypting a ci- phertext c, the receiver computes m[cmodN] and returns an error of m does not consist of 0z00 followed by ||N1l/2 – 16 arbitrary bits followed by 0r00. Show that this scheme is not CCA-secure. Why is it easier to construct a chosen-ciphertext attack on this scheme than on PKCS #1 v1.5? Show transcribed image text
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Answer to Consider Following Modified Version Padded Rsa Encryption Assume Messages Encrypted Length Q29335085 . . .
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